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I. INTRODUCTION
F "[T]HE first blow is half the battle,"' then the first blow in
litigation is selecting the battleground. This Article addresses
some unconventional approaches to ensure a federal forum in
aviation litigation. Specifically, the Article discusses: (1) federal
enclave jurisdiction; (2) jurisdiction based on international
comity and foreign relation concerns; (3) treaty jurisdiction
under the Texas Wrongful Death Act; (4) pooling and tiering
the foreign ownership interests in an entity in order to qualify
as a "foreign state" within the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act; (5) the filing of a third-party action against a foreign state
to come within the purview of the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act; (6) federal preemption under the Warsaw Convention;
(7) claims arising under the Death on the High Seas Act; (8)
federal preemption under the General Aviation Revitalization
Act; and (9) federal preemption of punitive and mental anguish
damages under the Airline Deregulation Act. With the excep-
tion of the last two categories, all the foregoing bases for subject
matter jurisdiction have been upheld in published opinions.
Thus, these arguments should assist the aviation litigant to land
in federal court.
II. FEDERAL ENCLAVE JURISDICTION
If a suit arises out of acts that occurred on federal property
within the United States, federal enclave jurisdiction may exist.
Federal enclave jurisdiction derives from Article I, Section 8,
Clause 17 of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that
Congress shall have the power "[t]o exercise exclusive Legisla-
tion in all Cases whatsoever.., over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall
be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards
and other needful Buildings. "2
1 OLIVER GOLDSMITH, SHE STOOPS TO CONQUER act II.
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; see Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264
(1963) ("[I]f the United States acquires with the 'consent' of the state legislature
land within the borders of that State by purchase or condemnation for any of the
purposes mentioned in Art. I, § 8, cl. 17,. . . the jurisdiction of the Federal Gov-
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When the federal government acquires title to state land with
the consent of the state legislature, Congress enjoys the exclu-
sive power to legislate such land.' The consent of the state is a
prerequisite to extinguishing state power.4 When a state consen-
sually cedes land to the United States, the state's "sovereignty
there over [is] terminated and federal sovereignty [becomes]
complete and exclusive.... -5 The purpose of this doctrine is to
safeguard federal authority in certain areas from interference by
the states.6 The rationale underlying this doctrine is that any
law in a territory over which the federal government has exclu-
sive sovereignty derives its authority and force from the United
States and, as such, is federal law.7 Relying on this doctrine as
their premise, federal courts have held that where federal en-
clave jurisdiction exists, the action is removable.'
ernment becomes 'exclusive."'); David E. Engdahl, Federalism and Energy: State
and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIz. L. REv. 283, 289 (1976) ("[T]he
courts from a very early date construed the language of the article I property
clause as conferring exclusive governmental jurisdiction upon the United
States."); Carl Strass, Note, Federal Enclaves-Through the Looking Glass-Darkly, 15
SYRACUSE L. REv. 754, 755 (1964) (citation omitted) ("Under this [the federal
enclave] provision, the federal government has acquired more than 5,000 parcels
over which it exercises such exclusive jurisdiction. Over forty are bigger than
Washington, D.C. Others are only as big as a single building, such as a post of-
fice."); Note, Federal Areas: The Confusion of a Jurisdictional-Geographical Dichotomy,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 124, 126 (1952).
[A] state may reserve powers other than the right to serve process
even over lands purchased with consent and may cede jurisdiction
over lands acquired for a purpose not specified in Art. I, § 8 of the
Constitution. Of course, where no jurisdiction has vested in the
United States its status is merely that of a proprietor.
Id. (citation omitted). Note, Land Under Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction: An Island
Within a State, 58 YALE L.J. 1402, 1402-03 (1949) ("State courts usually dismiss
lawsuits when a resident of such an area is a party on the ground that land under
exclusive federal jurisdiction is not a part of the state.").
3 Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 538 (1885); Paul, 371 U.S.
at 264.
4 Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 538.
5 Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir. 1952) (citing Surplus Trading
Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652 (1930)) (noting that Georgia had retained concur-
rent jurisdiction for some state functions); MARLIN M. VOLZ, FEDERAL PRACTICE
MANuAL § 7539 (2d ed. 1983) ("An action of negligence growing out of acts oc-
curring on lands within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States arises
under federal law and may therefore be brought in United States district court.")
(citing Mater, 200 F.2d at 123).
6 Richard T. Altieri, Federal Enclaves: The Impact of Exclusive Legislative Jurisdic-
tion Upon Civil Litigation, 72 MIL. L. REv. 55, 59 (1976).
7 Mater, 200 F.2d at 124.
8 Id. at 123; Willis v. Craig, 555 F.2d 724, 726 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977) ("We have no
quarrel with the propriety of enclave jurisdiction in this case.., even though the
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Thus, if an aircraft crashed, was maintained, or refueled on a
federal enclave, it may allow an ensuing action to be removed to
protect important federal interests. As explained in Akin v. Big
Three Industries, Inc.,9 "[t] he Constitutional clause prevents state
legislative interference with public lands" and provides a federal
forum to prevent "state judicial interference with matters likely
to involve substantial federal interests." 10 For example, if an air-
craft crashes on a military installation, sensitive issues of national
security may be implicated regardless of whether the aircraft is
privately owned. Or, if an aircraft is maintained on a federal
enclave, but crashes elsewhere, the action might still arise from
acts on the enclave sufficient to vest the federal court with
jurisdiction.
Such federal jurisdiction arises even though a state court has
concurrent jurisdiction. As explained in Mater v. Holley," for
purposes of federal jurisdiction, it is irrelevant that state courts
may enjoy concurrent jurisdiction within the federal enclave be-
cause "existing federal jurisdiction is not affected by concurrent ju-
risdiction in state courts.' 1 2 Moreover, defendants can remove an
action on federal enclave grounds even if the federal govern-
ment is not a party to the litigation.13
state courts may have concurrent jurisdiction."); Akin v. Big Three Indus., Inc.,
851 F. Supp. 819, 822 (E.D. Tex. 1994) ("The result of this holding [that federal
enclave jurisdiction is properly involved] is that the case presents a question aris-
ing under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is removable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441 (a).").
11 851 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
Io Id. at 822.
11 200 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1952).
12 Id. at 125 (emphasis added); see also Stevo v. CSX Transp., Inc., 940 F. Supp.
1222, 1224 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("Clearly, in a majority of jurisdictions, absent a spe-
cific statutory language to the contrary, concurrent jurisdiction does not bar re-
moval."); Akin, 851 F. Supp. at 822 n.1 ("Plaintiffs' argument that state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over transitory tort actions misses the point.
Whether the state court's jurisdiction is concurrent is irrelevant to the issue
whether a federal question is presented."); Fung v. Abex Corp., 816 F. Supp. 569,
571 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (following Willis and Mater). But see Pratt v. Kelly, 585 F.2d
692, 697 (4th Cir. 1978) (imposing exclusive jurisdiction requirement);
Melendez v. Glastic Corp., No. 2:95CV1112, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4537, at *8-9
(E.D. Va. Mar. 7, 1996) (rejecting Akin analysis).
13 See, e.g., Akin, 851 F. Supp. at 822 (the action was removable to federal court
by General Electric even though the federal government was not a party and GE
did not constitute "a federal officer"); OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 864 F. Supp.
1046, 1048 n.2 (D. Kan. 1994) (in action not involving the federal government as
a party, the court noted federal enclave jurisdiction could provide a basis for
removal); Fung, 816 F. Supp. at 571 (holding removal on federal enclave grounds
SUBJECT MATTER JUPJSDICTION
The Federal Reservations Act, 16 U.S.C. section 457, may con-
trol wrongful death actions arising from acts on a federal en-
clave. The Act provides that:
In the case of the death of any person by the neglect or wrongful
act of another within a national park or other place subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, within the exterior
boundaries of any State, such right of action shall exist as though
the place were under the jurisdiction of the State within whose
exterior boundaries such place may be; and in any action
brought to recover on account of injuries sustained in any such
place the rights of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the
State within the exterior boundaries of which it may be. 4
The Act's principal purpose was apparently to "make wrongful
death statutes ... applicable to federal enclaves where the com-
mon law bar against wrongful death actions still controlled.' 1 5 A
suit under 16 U.S.C. section 457 arises under federal law so as to
invoke federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331.16
III. INTERNATIONAL COMITY
The more aviation litigation impacts foreign concerns, the
greater the likelihood a court will hold that federal question ju-
risdiction, based on international comity or foreign relations
grounds, exists. Federal question jurisdiction exists over civil ac-
tions where a federal district court has "original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, trea-
ties or laws of the United States .... ,,"v The law of the United
States includes federal common law.' Thus, federal question
jurisdiction may exist where federal common law governs be-
cause such a claim may implicate foreign relations.'
was proper when plaintiffs personal injury claims arose on naval facility and
other federal enclaves).
14 16 U.S.C. § 457 (1994).
15 Burgio v. McDonnell Douglas Inc., 747 F. Supp. 865, 866 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
16 See Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 425 F. Supp. 81, 84-85 (D. Conn. 1977)
(finding federal enclave jurisdiction existed where wrongful death claims were
brought on behalf of marine officers who died in a helicopter crash within a
North Carolina federal enclave), on reconsideration, 505 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Conn.
1981).
17 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1993) ("The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Consti-
tution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
18 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972).
19 Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (fed-
eral common law exists in international disputes implicating foreign relations);
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our
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Claims that question or challenge foreign relations are also
incorporated into federal common law.2° If aviation litigation
affects international relations, this fact will substantially favor
removal of the action. 21 The fact that a foreign nation is not a
party to the action does not eviscerate the implications that the
litigation may have on foreign relations. 22
In an aviation context, if the aircraft was designed or assem-
bled to satisfy foreign specifications, or under foreign aircraft
certification rules, federal jurisdiction may exist if a plaintiff
challenges the standards under which the aircraft was designed
and assembled.23
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts ofjustice of appro-
priate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination.") (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1895)); Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 531-32 (S.D. Tex.
1994); Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 278 (S.D. Cal. 1986) ("[T]he plaintiffs
are correct in asserting that the 'laws' of the United States as defined in § 1331
include the Common Law ... and that the Common Law includes within it the
'law of nations."'); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 112(2) (1987) ("The determination and interpretation of international law
present federal questions ...."); CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3563 (2d ed. 1984) ("Customary international
law should be sufficient for federal-question jurisdiction.").
20 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (holding
that the "rules of international law should not be left to diverse and perhaps
parochial state interpretations"); Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d
344, 352-53 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, Ancor Holdings N.V. v. Republic of
Phillippines, 480 U.S. 942 (1987), cert. denied, New York Land Co. v. Republic of
Philippines, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); Enron Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum U.K., Ltd.,
No. H-96-1210, at 1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 1996) (denying remand on international
relations grounds in dispute that affected U.K. natural resources); Torres v.
Southern Peru Copper Corp., No. C-95-495, at 8 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 1995) (deny-
ing remand where suit affected Peruvian natural resource development "raised
issues of international relations which arise under federal common law"), affd,
No. 96-40203-CVO (5th Cir. May 19, 1997); Kern, 867 F. Supp. at 531-32; Sequihua
v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 63 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (denying remand because of
foreign relations implications arising from development of Ecuadorean re-
source); Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1338, 1365-66
(E.D. Tex. 1993) (denying remand because of foreign relations implications on
Kazakhstan resource); cf Aquafaith Shipping, Ltd. v. Jarillas, 963 F.2d 806, 808-09
(5th Cir. 1992) (remanding action where arguments concerning federal com-
mon law of foreign relations were foreclosed by the "well-pleaded complaint"
rule), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 955 (1992).
21 See Grynberg, 817 F. Supp. at 1356.
22 Id.; Kern, 867 F. Supp. at 531.
23 See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Apr. 4, 1947, art. 38, 61 Stat.
1180 (recognizing that contracting states may have different practices and stan-
dards than that prescribed by the International Civil Aviation Organization).
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
A discussion of this type of federal question jurisdiction is
found in Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc.24 Kern involved consoli-
dated claims arising from two separate crashes of Airbus aircraft
in Katmandu, Nepal. Chief Judge Norman W. Black of the
Southern District of Texas held that there was an independent
basis of federal question jurisdiction "because Plaintiffs' claims
raise questions of foreign relations which are incorporated into
federal common law."'25 The foreign interests that sustained fed-
eral jurisdiction arose from the foreign government's interest in
its own aviation regulations:
The interest these foreign sovereigns have in regulating their air-
craft, airlines and airspace outweighs any interests the United
States may have in applying its own air safety regulations to these
Defendants. "[E]very State has complete and exclusive sover-
eignty over the air space above its territory." They also control
the standards for safety and airworthiness within their country.
Since the interests of foreign countries in this litigation are sub-
stantial, there is federal question jurisdiction.26
Kern did not hold that it was necessary for the foreign air regula-
tions to insulate the defendant from liability before federal
question jurisdiction existed. It merely concluded the foreign
interest in its own airspace was so substantial as to create federal
question jurisdiction. The expanded but differing notion that
foreign laws insulate a defendant from liability and thus provide
federal question jurisdiction has been rejected:
[T]o the extent that defendants seek to pursue a defensive strat-
egy alleging that at least some of their actions should be insu-
lated from liability because those actions were taken in
compliance with regulations, programs, and policies of ... one
or more foreign governments, this strategy is insufficient to trans-
form the plaintiffs' claims into federal questions.27
TV. TREATY JURISDICTION
In certain situations, federal question jurisdiction may exist
where a foreign plaintiff sues under section 71.031 of the Texas
Revised Civil Practice and Remedies Code.28 In relevant part,
the Act provides as follows:
24 Kern, 867 F. Supp. at 531.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 532 (quoting Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note
23, at art. 1, 38); see Gyynberg, 817 F. Supp. at 1353-54.
27 Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1349 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
28 TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986).
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(a) An action for damages for the death or personal injury of a
citizen ... of a foreign country may be enforced in the courts of
this state, although the wrongful act, neglect, or default causing
the death or injury takes place in a foreign state or country, if:...
(3) in the case of a citizen of a foreign country, the country has
equal treaty rights with the United States on behalf of its citizens.29
In other words, where (1) damages for death or personal injury;
(2) are sought on behalf of a foreign citizen; (3) for a wrongful
act, neglect, or default; (4) causing a death or injury; (5) outside
of Texas, then the foreign citizen's country must have "equal
treaty rights" with the United States.3 The requirement that the
foreign citizen's country have "equal treaty rights" arguably cre-
ates federal question jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "a case may
arise under federal law 'where the vindication of a right under
state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal
law."' 3 Under section 71.031, the foreign plaintiff must prove
more than the mere existence of a treaty between the United
States and plaintiffs country. To satisfy its burden, the plaintiff
must prove the existence of specific treaty provisions that assure
certain litigation rights, as described in Dow Chemical Co. v. Al-
faro.3" In Alfaro, the Texas Supreme Court cited an example of
the treaty language required to satisfy section 71.031-the
29 Id. (emphasis added).
30 Id. One commentator has incorrectly written that the "equal treaty right"
requirement has been "deleted in revised legislation." Jordan J. Paust, "Equal
Treaty Rights" Under the Texas Open Forum Act, 60 Tex. B.J. 214, 214 (1997).
He is mistaken, the provision remains in section 71.031.
31 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808-09
(1986) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463
U.S. 1, 9 (1983)); see also Kidd v. Southwest Airlines Co., 891 F.2d 540, 542 (5th
Cir. 1990) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8); Hidalgo County Water Con-
trol & Improvement Dist. v. Hedrick, 226 F.2d 1, 6 (5th Cir. 1955) (reaffirming
ancient rule that a case "arises under" a treaty if its correct decision depends on
construction of the treaty), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956); United States v. Do-
herty, 615 F. Supp. 755, 757 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding federal subject matter
jurisdiction exists because "[t]he case at bar turns upon the proper construction
of a treaty between the United States and a foreign nation"), aff'd, 786 F.2d 491
(2d Cir. 1986); Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Summit Transp. Co., 481 F. Supp. 15,
18 (S.D. Tex 1979) (suit arises under laws of the United States where it "really
and substantially involves a dispute or controversy [of a law's] validity, construc-
tion, or effect"), aff'd, 614 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1980); Chapalain Compagnie v.
Standard Oil Co., 467 F. Supp. 181, 185 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("If the construction or
interpretation of a treaty will determine the plaintiff's success, then federal ques-
tion jurisdiction does in fact exist.").
32 786 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024 (1991). For a
discussion of Atfaro and the "equal treaty rights" provision, see RichardJ. Graving
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) from
July 10, 1851, between the United States and Costa Rica:
The citizens of the high contracting parties shall reciprocally re-
ceive and enjoy full and perfect protection for their persons and
property, and shall have free and open access to the courts of
justice in the said countries respectively, for the prosecution and
defense of their just rights; and they shall be at liberty to employ,
in all cases, the advocates, attorneys, or agents of whatever de-
scription, whom they may think proper, and they shall enjoy in
this respect the same rights and privileges therein as native
citizens.33
Thus, section 71.031 requires a court to interpret an FCN or
similar treaty to determine if the necessary rights exist. 4 Conse-
quently, an action under subsection 71.031 (a) (3) creates federal
question jurisdiction because the vindication of plaintiffs claims
necessarily turns on the interpretation of a treaty. If, however,
the plaintiff alleges that it does not rely upon any treaty, or, if no
such treaty exists, the plaintiff lacks standing to sue. 5 In Kern,
Chief Judge Black adopted this argument.3 6 Based on sec-
tion 71.031, the court found that plaintiffs were either in federal
court because such a treaty existed or they lacked standing to
& Elizabeth M. Wood, Wat are an Alien Plaintiff's "Equal Treaty Rights" Under Texas
CPRC 71.031? (South Texas College of Law Seminar, Jan. 23-24, 1997).
33 Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 675 n.2; see also RussellJ. Weintraub, International Litiga-
tion and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 327 (1994) ("In [Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Navigation] treaties, each country promises to afford
citizens of the other access to its courts that is the equivalent of access for its own
citizens."); Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1935 n.3
(1991) ("There is no legislative history on the meaning of that phrase [equal
treaty rights]. The United States does have treaties with numerous countries
guaranteeing free access to American courts, although most were entered into
well after enactment of the Texas statute.").
34 When looking to a multilateral agreement to determine if "equal treaty
rights" exist, courts should be mindful of the Second Circuit's caution that,
"When drafters of international agreements seek to provide equal access to na-
tional courts, the long-established practice is to do so explicitly." Murray v. British
Broadcasting Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 291 (2d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Some
have questioned whether denying the benefits of a wrongful death statute based
solely on the decedent's status would violate the equal protection clause. See
Ruth Downes, The Windfall Effect: Damages and the Foreign Plaintiff 9 REv. LITIG.
267, 283-93 (1990).
35 See, e.g., Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 675 n.2; Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v.
Baker, 838 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ).
36 867 F. Supp. at 531; see also Roman v. Aviateca, S.A., No. H-96-142 (S.D. Tex.
May 22, 1996). Roman was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, docket number 96-
20591. The court heard oral argument on March 5, 1997. An opinion had not
been released when this Article was submitted for publication.
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sue because there was no such treaty. "If no treaty exists or if
Plaintiffs contend they are not relying on a treaty, they lack
standing to sue. If there is a treaty, its construction permits re-
moval based on federal question jurisdiction. ' 37 Because the
court concluded that a treaty did exist, it could assert federal
subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims.38
Whether a plaintiff specifically identifies the bilateral or mul-
tilateral agreement granting equal treaty rights in the petition is
irrelevant to removal under the artful pleading doctrine.39
Thus, a defendant should be able to remove the action to fed-
eral court even if the petition does not specify the agreement, if
any, that grants equal treaty rights.
This basis of jurisdiction, however, has been rejected in at
least one published opinion.4" In Baker v. Bell Helicopter, Judge
McBryde found that "federal question jurisdiction does not exist
for an action brought under a state wrongful death statute, even
if, in the course of the trial, the court would be required to con-
strue a treaty."'4' The plaintiff in Baker asserted that federal
question jurisdiction existed because the equal treaty rights pro-
vision of section 71.031 required the court to construe a treaty.
The court, however, held that plaintiff's claims were not created
by treaty, but rather originated in Texas law.42 The court con-
cluded that "[t]he existence of equal treaty rights is not in the
forefront of the case, but is simply a collateral issue."43
As this Article was being finalized for publication, the Fifth
Circuit released its opinion in Torres v. Southern Peru Copper
Corp.44 The court rejected the contention that section 71.031
confers federal jurisdiction. Of course, even if section 71.031
37 Kern, 867 F. Supp. at 531; see, e.g., Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 675 n.2 (citing Hi-
dalgo County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 226 F.2d at 6).
38 Kern, 867 F.Supp. at 525.
39 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 10, 22; Aaron v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co., 876 F.2d 1157, 1160-61 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990);
Beers v. North Ain. Van Lines, Inc., 836 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1988) ("It is
axiomatic that a plaintiff may not defeat removal by fraudulent means or by 'art-
fully' omitting reference to essential federal questions."); Eitmann v. New Orle-
ans Pub. Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d 359, 365 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018
(1984).
40 Baker v. Bell Helicopter/Textron, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (N.D. Tex.
1995).




44 No. 96-40203 (5th Cir. May 19, 1997).
968
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
does not create jurisdiction, a plaintiff must still be prepared to
cite the agreement providing for "equal treaty rights" to avoid
dismissal in state court.
V. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT:
POOLING & TIERING
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)45 is the exclu-
sive basis of jurisdiction in federal and state courts for suits in-
volving foreign states.46 The threshold question in determining
whether the FSIA applies is whether a foreign state is a defend-
ant; however, the FSIA is broader than its name implies. Under
the FSIA, agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states may also
be considered a "foreign state. 47 Even a corporation may qual-
ify as a "foreign state" because the FSIA defines an "agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state" to mean an entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,
and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest
is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as
defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created
under the laws of any third country.48
The first and third requirements are relatively straight-for-
ward, but the language of the second requirement permits cer-
tain entities with an aggregate majority of foreign owners to
constitute foreign states. Most courts hold that an entity's own-
ership may be pooled and tiered to reach the FSIA's foreign-own-
ership threshold. To attain a majority threshold through
"pooling," one includes the direct ownership interest of each
foreign state. To attain a majority threshold through "tiering,"
one includes indirect as well as direct foreign-state ownership in
the calculus of the majority threshold.
4 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1994).
46 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) (quoting Argentine Repub-
lic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433 (1989)); Verlinden B.V. v.
Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 485 n.5, 488-89 (1983); United States v.
Moats, 961 F.2d 1198, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1992).
47 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1994); Moats, 961 F.2d at 1204 n.7.
48 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1994); In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind., 96
F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Congress expressly contemplated that business
entities could qualify as foreign states ....").
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A. POOLING PERMITTED
Section 1603(b) (2) does not require that a majority of shares
be owned by a single foreign state. The majority ownership
threshold may be satisfied by several foreign states pooling their
ownership interests. For example, if France owns twenty-five
percent of Compagnie A and Germany owns twenty-six percent,
their fifty-one percent pooled interest satisfies section
1603(b) (2). The Fifth Circuit stated in dicta that Airbus Indus-
trie qualified as an agency or instrumentality of foreign states
under the FSIA by pooling its foreign ownership interest.49 As
the Fifth Circuit noted, courts have consistently approved of
multinational pooling under the FSIA:
We also observe that the district court questioned whether the
interests of two or more foreign states could be combined, com-
menting that "pooling" appears to be foreclosed by the use of the
state ("singular") in the FSIA.5 ° This reasoning probably should
be examined in light of the rules of statutory construction, (for
example, 1 U.S.C. section 1 providing that "words importing the
singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things"
unless the context indicates otherwise), and in light of the cases
in which the pooling issue has been considered.5 1
Pooling was examined exhaustively by the multidistrict litigation
(MDL) court in In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana.
The court summarized its conclusions, reasoning:
49 Linton v. Airbus Indus., 30 F.3d 592, 597-98 n.29 (5th Cir.) (recognizing
that Airbus, at least facially, "presented a strong factual and legal claim of immu-
nity [under the FSIA]"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 639 (1994); See Kern, 867 F. Supp.
at 531 (allowing pooling and holding that Airbus is a foreign state under the
FStA).
50 Linton, 30 F.3d at 598 n.29 (citing Linton v. Airbus Indus., 794 F. Supp. 650,
652 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
51 Id. (emphasis added). See Mangattu v. M/V IBN HAVYAN, 35 F.3d 205, 207
(5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the argument that the FSIA "requires that 51% or more
of Appellee's stock be owned by a single foreign state," and holding that several
foreign states can pool their ownership interests); Ratnaswamy v. Air Afrique, No.
95-C-7670, 1996 WL 507267, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1996); In reAircrash Disaster
Near Roselawn, Ind., 909 F. Supp. 1083, 1090 (N.D. Ill. 1995), affd, 96 F.3d 932
(7th Cir. 1996); In re EAL (Delaware) Corp., No. 93-578-SLR, 1994 WL 828320, at
*4 (D. Del. Aug. 3, 1994); Aluminum Distrib., Inc. v. Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill
Co., No. 87-C-6477, 1989 WL 64174, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 1989); LeDonne v.
Gulf Air, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (E.D. Va. 1988); Rios v. Marshall, 530
F. Supp. 351, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553, 568-69 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd on other grounds,
649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Aboujdid v.
Singapore Airlines, Ltd., 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,059 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 11,
1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, 494 N.E.2d 1055 (1986).
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We concur with the majority of courts that have permitted the
pooling of ownership interests for purposes of determining
whether § 1603(b) (2)'s majority ownership requirement is met.
In the first place, we find that 1 U.S.C. § 1 permits reading
§ 1603(b) (2) as referring to majority ownership by "foreign
states" rather than simply "a foreign state." Moreover, we find
that the wooden reading urged by the plaintiffs would most as-
suredly frustrate the FSIA's objective of providing "a comprehen-
sive jurisdictional scheme in cases involving foreign states."
There is simply no sound policy justification for reading the FSIA
to apply to an entity majority owned by one foreign state but not
to apply to an entity majority owned by two or more foreign
states. The sensitive concerns raised by a federal court's exercise
of jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign are no less implicated in
the latter context.5
2
But pooling need not necessarily be multinational. At least
one federal court has held that a single foreign state can pool its
own interests. In Credit Lyonnais v. Getty Square Associates,53
Credit Lyonnais (CL) argued that it satisfied the definition of
"foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. section 1603 because
a majority of its shares are owned by the Republic of France....
France owns outright 48.5% of CL's outstanding shares. In addi-
tion, . . . France owns 99.97% of SPBI SNC, another French cor-
poration, which has an 8.67% ownership in CL. After pooling its
ownership in CL, . . . France is a 57.17% shareholder.54
The district court noted that "[n]either CL nor this Court has
found any direct authority allowing one foreign state to pool its
ownership interests in different entities to satisfy the require-
ments of section 1603(b) (2)."5 Nevertheless, the court allowed
pooling by France alone, holding that "[s]uch a result does not
distort the plain meaning of the statute" and concluding that
"because France may pool SPBI SNC's shares, a corporation of
which France owns 99.97 percent, toward the ownership re-
quirements of section 1603(b), the court has subject matter ju-
risdiction over this action. 56 As a result, under the rationale
52 In re Roselawn, 909 F. Supp. at 1093 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6611). The Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed the MDL court's reasoning. In re Aircrash Disaster Near
Roselawn, Ind., 96 F.3d at 937-38.
53 876 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
- Id. at 519-20 (emphasis added).
55 Id. at 520.
56 Id.
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espoused by Credit Lyonnais, pooling is permissible even if only a
single foreign state has ownership interests in a pooled entity.
Sometimes, the majority threshold may not be reached by
pooling foreign ownership. Jurisdiction may still exist, however,
as the FSIA allows tiering.
B. TIERING PERMITTED
Foreign government ownership need not be direct, it may be
tiered, and still contribute toward total government ownership.
The FSIA provides that an entity is an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state if the majority of its "shares or other ownership
interest is owned by a foreign state or a political subdivision
thereof."57  The statute imposes no manner or form require-
ment for the relevant ownership interest. Specifically, the FSIA
is silent as to intermediary entities through which foreign states
may choose to own interest in an entity.
Several courts have employed this tiered-ownership calcula-
tion, counting the foreign-state ownership interests in the inter-
mediary entity toward the majority ownership of the entity
seeking to invoke the FSIA protection.58
57 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2) (1994).
58 See, e.g., In re Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 939-41 (indirect French and Italian govern-
ment interest included); O'Connell Mach. Co. v. M.V. "Americana," 734 F.2d 115
(2d Cir. 1984) (Italian government controlled the majority of the shares of a ship
line through the independent finance arm of a state organization), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1086 (1984); Credit Lyonnais, 876 F. Supp. at 519-20 (defining Credit
Lyonnais as a foreign state within § 1603 when it was 48.5% outright owned by
France and when France owned 99.97% of another French corporation which, in
turn, had an 8.67% ownership in Credit Lyonnais, for a total French ownership
interest of 57.17%); Trump Taj Mahal Assocs. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Gio-
vanni Agusta, S.P.A., 761 F. Supp. 1143 (D.N.J. 1991) (Italian government held
majority interest in helicopter manufacturer through several tiers of in-
termediaries), affd, 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992); Alu-
minum Distrib., 1989 WL 64174, at *2 (considering interest owned by government
through intermediary in which it had a minority interest); Rutkowski v. Occiden-
tal Chem. Corp., No. 83-C-2339, 1988 WL 107342, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1988)
(holding defendant was foreign state although ownership by Quebec was tiered
through two corporations); Keller v. Transportes Aereos Militares Ecuadorianos,
601 F. Supp. 787, 788 (D.D.C. 1985) (finding that defendant was a foreign state
when a majority of its shares were owned by an "instrumentality of a foreign
state"); Clemente v. Philippine Airlines, 614 F. Supp. 1196, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(Philippine government held airline through two intermediary corporations); cf.
Canadian Overseas Ores, Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico S.A., 727 F.2d
274, 275 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that Chilean corporation was a "foreign state"
for purposes of the FSIA when a controlling interest was owned by the Chilean
government).
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The Fifth Circuit, in dicta, rejected opposition to the tiering
approach:
[T]he resolution of the Airbus Defendants' claim of immunity
turns on whether through "tiering" a foreign state's ownership
interest can be attributed when that foreign state did not own a
majority interest ... in Airbus. The district court answered this
question in the negative. 9 Hence, Germany's interests could not
be pooled since Germany failed to own a majority interest in the
companies through which Germany held its ownership interest
in the Airbus Defendants. The controlling statute, however,
erects no explicit bar to the methods by which a foreign state
may own an instrumentality, merely requiring that the entity
claiming immunity-not its parent-have "a majority of [its]
shares or other ownership interest... owned by a foreign state or
a political subdivision thereof."6 ° There is no mention of "vot-
ing" or "control" majority, thus equitable or beneficial majority
ownership is not expressly prohibited from serving.6"
More recently, in Delgado v. Shell Oil Co.,62 the court expressly
recognized that the FSIA permits tiering:
Dead Sea has introduced uncontradicted evidence that Israel
owns, albeit indirectly, roughly two-thirds of the outstanding
shares of Dead Sea. The fact that Israel's ownership interest in
Dead Sea is "indirect" because Dead Sea is a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of an entity in which Israel owns an indirect majority in-
terest is immaterial."
If tiering were not allowed, the results might be absurd. For
example, if the chain of intermediate entities is extended, with a
foreign sovereign owning 49.9% of each tier, after the second
tier, the foreign sovereign would own almost 87.49% of the en-
tity applying for FSIA immunity. After the third tier, the foreign
sovereigns would own almost 93.74%. In each case, however, if
a court were not allowed to tier, the applying entity would be
denied FSIA protection. Paradoxically, if tiering were prohib-
ited, an entity owned almost exclusively by foreign sovereigns
would be denied FSIA immunity, while an entity with merely
59 See Linton, 794 F. Supp. at 653-54.
60 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2) (1994).
61 Linton, 30 F.3d at 598 n.29 (emphasis added); see also Kern, 867 F. Supp. at
531 (finding that Al qualified as a foreign sovereign under the FSIA).
62 890 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
63 Id. at 1318 n.5 (citation omitted); see, e.g., Talbot v. Saipem A.G., 835 F.
Supp. 352, 353 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that defendant was a foreign state
although it was indirectly owned by Italy's Ministry of the Treasury).
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50.01% direct, foreign-sovereign ownership would enjoy such
immunity.
The more reasonable inquiry is whether a majority of the
ownership interest in the entity seeking FSIA protection would
be distributed to foreign sovereigns upon dissolution. The ulti-
mate-ownership test complies with the letter of the FSIA, while
avoiding arbitrary, absurd applications of the FSIA. A concern
that allowing "pooling" and "tiering" unfairly broadens the class
of entities qualifying for immunity overlooks the exceptions to
sovereign immunity64 that still might apply even if section 1603
is satisfied, namely, the "commercial activity" exception. 5
Some courts, however, have rejected pooling and tiering.66
But these holdings have been criticized. For example, the MDL
court in Roselawn had this criticism of Gates: "Although the Gates
court's analysis has an arguable foundation, we believe that its
conclusion is inconsistent with the plain language of the Act as
well as its legislative history. '67 The Roselawn MDL court found
that the alleged "literal reading" of the FSIA by Gates "is
achieved only by nullifying a key definitional provision of the
Act and ignoring the House Judiciary Committee's analysis of
that definitional provision."6 The MDL court's criticism of
Gates was reiterated by the Seventh Circuit on appeal.69 The Sev-
enth Circuit noted that "[t]he use of 'includes' [in the FSIA]
shows Congress' intent to broadly define 'foreign state.""'7 ° The
court also emphasized that "[c] lose analysis confirms the district
court's resolution of the question of 'tiering.' The Act does not
expressly require direct ownership, nor does it exclude the form
in which France and Italy hold [the defendant company] as an
instrumentality."'"
64 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607 (1994).
65 Id. § 1605(a) (2); see Brown v. Valmet-Appleton, 77 F.3d 860, 862-63 (5th Cir.
1996) (finding company a "foreign state" tinder § 1603 but not immune under
§ 1605(a) (2)).
66 See Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1461-62 (9th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Fletcher's Fine Foods, Ltd. v. Gates, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995); Gardiner
Stone Hunter Int'l v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, S.A., 896 F. Supp. 125
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re Hashim, 188 B.R. 633, 640-41 (D. Ariz. 1995).
67 In re Roselawn, 909 F. Supp. at 1096.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 940-41.
0 Id. at 940.
71 Id. at 941.
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Gardiner's rationale may also be suspect. The court in Gardiner
relies on Judge Kent's opinion in Linton v. Airbus Industrie.7 2
However, as noted above, the Fifth Circuit criticized Judge
Kent's calculation of whether Airbus Industrie's foreign owner-
ship satisfied the FSIA.7S Initially, the Fifth Circuit's criticism
was echoed by the state court. In an unpublished opinion after
remand of the case, the state court rejected Judge Kent's analy-
sis, holding that Airbus was a foreign state under the FSIA.74
But this criticism may have been short lived. The Texas Court of
Appeals reversed the district court's finding that Airbus satisfied
section 1603(b). 75 The appellate court acknowledged the pro-
priety of pooling, "find[ing] that the pooling of ownership inter-
ests between foreign sovereigns where no single state owns more
than 50% is acceptable under the FSIA. '"76 Furthermore, the ap-
pellate court reiterated that "tiering through a majority owned in-
termediary is permissible to determine whether an entity is
entitled to foreign state status under the FSIA. ' 77 But the court
was unwilling to allow tiering through non-majority-owned in-
termediaries, concluding that it would be "incongruous with the
language and purpose of the Act to allow minority foreign state
ownership in a privately owned entity to be tiered and pooled to
achieve foreign-state status under the FSIA.' '7' Airbus has peti-
tioned the Texas Supreme Court to clarify this important
issue.79
VI. FSIA JURISDICTION THROUGH A THIRD-PARTY
ACTION
Even if a defendant cannot qualify as a foreign sovereign
under the FSIA, a third-party defendant might. A defendant
may sue a third party who is a "foreign sovereign" under the
FSIA and this third-party, foreign-sovereign defendant may re-
move the action to federal court.80 A court should not concern
72 794 F. Supp. 650 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
73 Linton, 30 F.3d at 598 n.29.
74 Nos. 92-C-0375, 92-C-0404 (23d Dist. Ct., Brazoria County, Tex. Feb. 9,
1995).
75 Linton v. Airbus Indus., 934 S.W.2d 754, 759 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1996, writ requested).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 762 (emphasis added).
78 Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
79 See supra note 75.
80 See, e.g., Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1063-64 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 962 (1991); In re Roselawn, 909 F. Supp. at 1089-90.
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itself "with why these parties prefer to be in federal court so long
as there is a legitimate basis for jurisdiction."'"
In mostjurisdictions, such a third-party defendant can remove
the entire action to federal court.8 2 However, not all jurisdic-
tions allow a defendant to remove the entire action.8 ' These
courts relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Finley v. United
States. 4 Finley, however, was legislatively overruled by the enact-
ment of 28 U.S.C. section 1367, which expressly provides for
pendent-party jurisdiction. 5 Thus, the Boeing and Roselawn line
of authority permitting removal of the entire action is more
persuasive."
VII. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
As discussed above, an action arising from a treaty with the
United States may support federal court jurisdiction. Likewise,
cases arising out of international air transportation are governed
by the Warsaw Convention and are within a federal court's origi-
nal jurisdiction. 7  The courts are divided, however, over
81 In re Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 942; see also City of Chicago v. Mills, 204 U.S. 321,
330 (1907) (noting that if a suit "is free from fraud or collusion, [a party's] mo-
tive in preferring a federal tribunal is immaterial").
82 Id. (finding removal of entire action consistent with congressional intent);
In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974 F.2d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that the underlying claims against the domestic defendant as well as the third-
party claims against the foreign defendant may be removed); Nolan, 919 F.2d at
1066 (identical holding as In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974 F.2d at 1255);
Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1990);
Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404, 1407-09 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (d) conferred jurisdiction over the entire civil action and
not just the claims against the foreign state in a suit naming both foreign and
domestic defendants); Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371,
1375-76 (5th Cir. 1980); Lopez del Valle v. Gobierno de la Capital, 855 F. Supp.
34, 36-37 (D. P.R. 1994); Noonan v. Possfund Inv., Ltd., No. 89-2903, 1994 WL
515440, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,1994); Didi v. Destra Shipping Co., No. 93-1851,
1993 WL 232075 (E.D. La. June 17, 1993).
83 SeeSchlumberger Indus., Inc. v. National Sur. Corp., 36 F.3d 1274, 1281 (4th
Cir. 1994) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) does not confer pendent-partyjuris-
diction); Alifieris v. American Airlines, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1189, 1192 (E.D.N.Y.
1981) (holding that only the third-party complaint against the foreign state may
be removed and remanding other claims to state court).
84 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
85 In re Roselawn, 909 F. Supp. at 1103.
8 1 Id.; see also In re Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 943 n.4 (agreeing with the district court
that Schlumberger presented a unique situation where the foreign defendant was
dismissed before the merits were reached).
87 See, e.g., In reAir Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267
(2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 920 (1991); Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
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whether the Warsaw Convention creates an exclusive cause of
action and whether it preempts state law causes of action.88
In Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World
Airways,89 the Fifth Circuit held that the Warsaw Convention cre-
ates the cause of action and exclusive remedy against air carriers
in article 18 claims.9" The court stated as follows:
The essential inquiry is whether the Convention provides the ex-
clusive liability remedy for international air carriers by providing
an independent cause of action, thereby preempting state law, or
whether it merely limits the amount of recovery for a cause of
action otherwise provided by state or federal law. We have not
previously addressed this question. We hold today that the War-
saw Convention creates the cause of action and is the exclusive
remedy.91
The court also concluded that the Warsaw Convention preempts
state law "in the areas covered," reasoning that "[a] n obvious
major purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to secure uni-
formity of liability for air carriers. That uniformity has both an
international and intranational application. The law of Texas,
as it relates to the cause of action, is preempted."92
Boehringer's reasoning was followed by the Second Circuit in
Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc.93 The Second Circuit concluded that "the existence of sepa-
rate state causes of action conflicts so strongly with the uniform
872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 530 (1991); Boehr-
inger-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 737 F.2d 456
(5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985); In re Mexico City Aircrash, 708
F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983).
88 Compare Boehringer-Mannheim, 737 F.2d at 456 and In re Air Disaster at Lock-
erbie, 928 F.2d at 1267 with In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932
F.2d 1475, 1490-99 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Mikva, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom.
Dooley v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 502 U.S. 994 (1991); and In reAircrash in Bali,
Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.8 (9th Cir. 1982); 1 LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIATION
ACCIDENT LAW § 10.08 (1996) (discussing opinions that have examined whether
the Warsaw Convention creates a cause of action).
89 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985).
90 Id. The Fifth Circuit later held that the Warsaw Convention creates the ex-
clusive cause of action and remedy for Article 17 claims. See Potter v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881, 887 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e conclude that article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention creates the exclusive cause of action and the exclusive
remedy for all international transportation of persons performed by aircraft for
hire.").
91 Boehringer, 737 F.2d at 458.
92 Id. at 459.
93 928 F.2d at 1273-78.
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enforcement of the [Warsaw Convention] that [the normal pre-
sumption against preemption] is overcome. 9 4
Courts are split over whether the Warsaw Convention com-
pletely preempts state law claims so as to support removal juris-
diction. While several courts have held that the Warsaw
Convention supports federal court jurisdiction,95 other courts
have rejected this argument.96 Thus, like other bases ofjurisdic-
tion discussed in this Article, the existence of subject matter ju-
risdiction may vary with the forum selected.
VIII. DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT
The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)97 provides that:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine
league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia,
or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the per-
sonal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for
damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty,
for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent,
child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corpo-
ration which would have been liable if death had not ensued.9"
This mandate encompasses tort claims for wrongful death aris-
ing from the crash of an aircraft into navigable waters beyond a
marine league from the shores of the United States or its territo-
ries, including the territorial waters of a foreign country.99
94 Id. at 1278.
95 See, e.g., Romano v. British Airways, 943 F. Supp. 623, 626 (N.D. W. Va.
1996); Garcia v. Aerovias de Mexico, S.A., 896 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (S.D. Fla.
1995); Ajibola v. Sabena Belgium Airline, No. 2479, 1995 WL 552737, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1995); Luna v. Compania Panamena de Aviacion, S.A., 851 F.
Supp. 826, 831 (S.D. Tex. 1994);Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 820 F. Supp.
1218, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Alvarez v. Servicios Aereos de Honduras, S.A., No.
H-93-3060, 24 Av. Cas. 17,888, 17,889 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 1994).
96 See, e.g., Zinn v. American Jet, S.A., No. CV-96-4251, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16331, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 1996); Campos v. Sociedad Aeronautica de Me-
dellin Consolidad, S.A., 882 F. Supp. 1056, 1059 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Clark v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1209, 1210 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Alvarez v. Aerovias
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 756 F. Supp. 550, 555-56 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Calde-
ron v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, Avianca, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Fla.
1990), appeal dismissed, 929 F.2d 599 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 (1991).
97 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1994).
98 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1994).
99 Sanchez v. Loffland Bros. Co., 626 F.2d 1228, 1230 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); In reAir Crash Disaster Near Bombay, India, 531 F.
Supp. 1175, 1182-84 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
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DOHSA provides the exclusive remedy for deaths on the high
seas and preempts state wrongful death statutes.100
Courts are split on whether DOHSA claims brought in state
court are removable to federal court as federal questions. Sev-
eral courts have held that DOHSA claims are not removable. 10 1
Other courts have found that DOHSA claims are removable.10 2
But the line of authority supporting removal enjoys limited sup-
port. For instance, as noted by the court in Baker,'°3 Phillips (ap-
proving DOHSA removal) has been widely criticized or ignored
by other courts.10 4 Also, although the Fifth Circuit has not de-
cided this matter directly, the court, in dicta, recently cited Filho
(disapproving DOHSA removal) favorably, while failing to men-
tion Phillips. 105
IX. THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT
As of January 12, 1997, no published case had addressed
whether the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA)
creates federal question jurisdiction by completely preempting
state causes of action.'06 GARA provides that no civil action for
damages for death or injury arising out of an accident involving
a general aviation aircraft may be brought against an aircraft
manufacturer or a manufacturer of any component, part, or sys-
tem of the aircraft more than eighteen years after the date of
delivery of the aircraft by the manufacturer to its first pur-
100 Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 227 (1986).
10l See Baker, 907 F. Supp. at 1010; Zaini v. Shell Oil Co., 853 F. Supp. 960, 965
(S.D. Tex. 1994); De Bello v. Brown & Root, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 482, 485 (E.D.
Tex. 1992); Argandona v. Lloyd's Registry of Shipping, 804 F. Supp. 326, 327-28
(S.D. Fla. 1992); Filho v. Pozos Int'l Drilling Servs., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 94, 100
(S.D. Tex. 1987); see also In re Medscope Marine Ltd., 972 F.2d 107, 110 n.17 (5th
Cir. 1992) (noting in dicta that Filho was a "persuasive, well-reasoned, and schol-
arly opinion concluding that DOHSA cases are nonremovable").
102 Phillips v. Offshore Logistics, 785 F. Supp. 1241, 1242 (S.D. Tex. 1992);
Kearney v. Litton Precision Gear, No. 87-8335-KN, 1988 WL 383575, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 17, 1988).
103 907 F. Supp. at 1010.
104 See De Bello, 809 F. Supp. at 486; Argandona, 804 F. Supp. at 328.
105 Medscope Marine, 972 F.2d at 110 n.17.
106 In Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd, 930 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Mich. 1996), defendants
removed an action to federal court arguing that, because of the application of
GARA, "[i]ts state-created cause of action presents a substantial federal question
and therfore 'arises under' federal law." Id. at 303. The court rejected defend-
ants' argument. Id. at 303-05. Defendants, however did "not rely on complete
preemption for removal." Id. at 302. See also Robert F. Hedrick, A Close and Criti-
cal Analysis of the New General Aviation Revitalization Act, 62 J. AiR LAW & COMM.
385, 415-16 (1996) (discussing preemption and Wright).
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chaser. 10 7 Importantly, GARA provides that "[t] his section super-
sedes any State law to the extent that such law permits a civil
action" covered by the Act to be brought after the eighteen-year
limitation period. 1 s Congress intended the statute to insulate
aircraft manufacturers from liability greater than eighteen years
after the initial purchase and delivery of the aircraft.1 °9 Presi-
dent Clinton explained that "It]he Act establishes an 18-year
statute of repose for general aviation aircraft and component
parts beyond which the manufacturer will not be liable in law-
suits alleging defective manufacture or design." 110  It may be
argued that GARA, and particularly section 2 (d), manifests Con-
gress's intent to completely preempt claims against an aircraft or
component part manufacturer filed more than eighteen years
after delivery to the first purchaser.' 11
The complete preemption doctrine holds that a federal ques-
tion exists where a federal statute so thoroughly regulates a field
that any viable suit in the field is necessarily federal. '2 Under
the doctrine of complete preemption, the preemptive power of
a federal statute may be "so 'extraordinary' that it 'converts an
ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal
claim.""'" Once a state law issue has been completely pre-
empted by a federal statute, any claim that is based on the state
law arises from its inception under federal law.'1 4
The complete preemption doctrine applies when a federal
statute has eradicated any legitimate or viable state cause of ac-
tion.' "Although a defense, preemption may so forcibly and
completely displace state law that the plaintiffs cause of action
is wholly federal or nothing at all."' I6 The doctrine allows a de-
107 General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 40101, note
§§ 2(a), 3(3) (1994).
108 Id. § 2(d).
Io- H.R. REP. No. 103-525(I), 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1638, 1640.
110 STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON UPON SIGNING THE GENERAL
AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF 1994, 1994 PUB. PAPERS II (Aug. 17, 1994).
III Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773, 776-83 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 926 (1990).
112 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).
113 Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987));
see Brown v. Crop Hail Management, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 519, 523 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
114 Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393.





fendant to remove any case to federal court that falls within the
purview of the preempting statute.1 17
However, courts may rely on GARA's legislative history to
demonstrate that it does not create federal question jurisdiction
through complete preemption. For example, on September 15,
1993, when Representative Dan Glickman of Kansas introduced
the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993 in the House of
Representatives, he noted the limited scope of the proposed leg-
islation: "Unlike my previous legislation seeking product liabil-
ity reform, the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993 does
not create a Federal standard of liability or limit the jurisdiction
of any State court."1 18 In another example, Senator Hatch clari-
fied "what this bill does not do:" "Let me state for the record
that S. 1458 does not create a Federal standard of liability, limit the
jurisdiction of any State court, or attempt to change existing State
laws regarding joint and several liability, comparative fault, or
punitive damages."11 9 The House Report took the same narrow
view, finding that:
[T] he legislation may be viewed as a narrow and considered re-
sponse to the 'perceived' liability crisis in the general aviation
industry. Rather than seeking to revise substantially a number of
substantive and procedural matters relating to State tort law, as
earlier legislative efforts would have done, S. 1458 is limited to
creating a statute of repose.1
20
Thus, the Act remains a potential basis for federal jurisdiction,
albeit a novel and largely untested one.
"7 Baker v. Farmers Elec. Co-op, Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1994); 1
GEORGE P. KAZEN, JAMEs L. BRANTON, & HARRY REASONER, FEDERAL CIVIL PROCE-
DURE BEFORE TRIAL-5TH CIRCUIT 53:584 (1996) ("When preemption is com-
plete, it, can provide a sufficient basis for removal to federal court even though
preemption is raised as a defense, not withstanding the well-pleaded complaint
rule.") (citing Hubbard v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 42 F.3d 942 (5th Cir.
1995)).
118 139 CONG. REC. E2183-01 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Glickman).
119 139 CONG. REC. S12457-04, S12458 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1993) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added).
120 H.R. REP. No. 103-525 (II), 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644, 1647; see also Timothy S. McAllister, A "Tail" of Liability
Reform: General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 and the General Aviation Industry
in the United States, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 301, 310-12 (1995).
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X. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF PUNITIVE AND MENTAL
ANGUISH DAMAGES UNDER THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT
The Supreme Court of the United States has explained that
the Airline Deregulation Act does not preempt common-law-tort
causes of action or state law breach of contract actions against
an airline, but rather preempts state-imposed regulation of the
rates, routes, or services of air carriers.1 21 Recently, however,
both state and federal courts have questioned whether claims
for punitive damages or mental anguish might differ from the
general rule that common-law-tort causes of action are not pre-
empted. For instance, in Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer,1 2 2 the
Texas Supreme Court suggested, without deciding, that punitive
damages and mental anguish claims might be preempted. The
court stated:
We recognize that with negligence law, and other tort law, there
is a greater risk that state policies will be too much involved than
there is with contract law [sic], especially in the area of damages.
For example, recovery of punitive damages for negligence is, de-
pending on the State involved, essentially unlimited, limited by
judicial rule, limited by statute, shared between the plaintiff and
the state, or disallowed altogether. One could easily argue that
the threat of punitive damages against airlines has a greater regu-
latory effect than liability for actual damages. Also, recovery of
damages for mental anguish may or may not require accompany-
ing physical injury, or aggravated conduct by the defendant, or
be subject to other restrictions .... Of course, plaintiffs [in this
case] may amend their pleadings before trial to claim punitive
damages, but we decline to speculate whether such claims would,
in these cases or other situations, be preempted by the ADA....
[Nevertheless, o] ther tort actions might [impair the deregulation
of the ADA], and as we have said, so might recovery in negli-
gence actions for punitive damages or even mental anguish
damages. 123
Some federal courts have explicitly decided the issue, con-
cluding that claims for punitive damages are in fact preempted
by the ADA. The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion in West
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.'24 The plaintiff was bumped from an
121 See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 825-26 (1995); see
also Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995).
122 920 S.W.2d 274, 282-83 (Tex. 1996).
123 Id.
124 995 F.2d 148, 152 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1111 (1994).
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overbooked flight and subsequently filed claims in state court
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under
Montana law and for unjust discrimination under the Federal
Aviation Act (FAA), seeking both compensatory and punitive
damages on the state and federal claims. The claims were re-
moved to federal court on the basis of diversity.'25 The district
court then granted summary judgment to the defendant, find-
ing that plaintiffs state claim was preempted by the FAA and
that his federal claims were untimely. 126 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit held that the state law claim against Northwest for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was pre-
empted under the ADA only to the extent that it sought punitive
damages, but was not preempted to the extent it sought com-
pensatory damages. 127 The court reasoned that:
Were we to hold that West's state claims are preempted com-
pletely by the ADA, we would eviscerate the third option detailed
in the regulation .... West's right to pursue punitive damages in his
state claims, however, must be limited. Since punitive damages by
their very nature seek to punish the entity against whom they are
awarded, such damages awarded in response to bumping result-
ing from airline overbooking would be contrary to the goals of
deregulation. Overbooking and bumping are accepted forms of
price competition and reduction in the deregulation period,
thus any law or regulation which results in penalizing airlines for
these practices is preempted by the FAA.' 2 8
As a result, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the federal
district court to resolve the merits of West's state law claims.
12
Other federal courts have followed the lead of the Ninth Cir-
cuit. For example, in Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia,'30 the Seventh Circuit concluded that the ADA
preempts claims for punitive damages for breach of contract.
The court recognized that:
[T]he plaintiffs' breach of contract claim also contains a request
for punitive damages. Wolens noted that "some state-law princi-
ples of contract law ... might well be preempted to the extent
they seek to effectuate the State's public policies, rather than the
intent of the parties." Rather than merely holding parties to the
125 Id. at 150.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 152.
128 Id. (emphasis added).
129 Id.
130 73 F.3d 1423, 1432 n.8 (7th Cir. 1996).
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terms of a bargain, punitive damages represent an "enlargement
or enhancement [of the bargain] based on state laws or policies
external to the agreement." Thus, Wolens suggests that the claim
for punitive damages is preempted by the ADA, provided that it
relates to airline rates, routes or services. The breach of contract
claim clearly relates to Saudia's failure to provide its services, i.e.,
transportation, to Travel All's clients in accordance with its
agreement with Travel All. Therefore, we conclude that the ADA
preempts the plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages. 13'
Given the trend among federal courts to conclude that claims
for punitive damages are preempted by the ADA, defendants
may be able to remove cases to federal court when a plaintiff
seeks punitive damages or recovery for mental anguish. How-
ever, the Sixth Circuit concluded that there was "no evidence
that Congress intended the federal courts to have exclusive sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the preemption defenses to state
law claims against air carriers.' 1 2
If a litigant relies on this argument or another novel approach
to sustain subject matter jurisdiction in the district court, but is
concerned with maintaining jurisdiction on appellate review, a
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision might provide reassurance.
In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis,13  the defendant removed the action
to federal court on diversity grounds when, in fact, diversity ju-
risdiction did not exist because of a non-diverse defendant. 34
The plaintiff timely moved for remand, but the district court
incorrectly denied the motion to remand.'35 By the time judg-
ment was entered, the non-diverse defendant had been dis-
missed; thus, when judgment was entered, subject matter
jurisdiction existed.1 6 On this basis, the Supreme Court al-
lowed the judgment to stand even though the action was im-
properly removed.' 37 A lesson to be drawn from Caterpillar is
13' Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
132 Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1253 (6th
Cir. 1996). The Sixth Circuit relied, in part, on the Supreme Court's finding that
"the ADA, unlike ERISA, did not intend to 'channel actions into federal court."'
Id. (citing American Airlines, 115 S. Ct. at 825); see also Merkel v. Federal Express
Corp., 886 F. Supp. 561, 568 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (holding that preemption under
the ADA would not create removal jurisdiction).
133 117 S. Ct. 467 (1996).
134 Id. at 470-71.
135 Id. at 471.
136 Id. at 474.
137 Id. at 475-76; see Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (declin-
ing to apply the "considerations of finality, efficiency and economy" that con-
cerned the court in Caterpillar in a non-removal context).
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that if one sustains jurisdiction on novel grounds in the district
court, one may want to attempt to create diversity jurisdiction
(or some other basis of jurisdiction) by the time judgment is
entered to prevent a remand or dismissal by the appellate court
for lack of jurisdiction. Thanks to this decision, the new subject
matter jurisidiction rule is "all's well that ends well."'138
XI. CONCLUSION
This Article has discussed various approaches that may land
an aviation litigant in federal court. The ultimate wisdom of
such a strategy should be considered carefully before a party
plunges headlong into a frenzied effort to obtain relief in fed-
eral court, only to find that such relief may have been both read-
ily available and more expediently obtained in state court. If the
first blow is truly half the battle, a party should seriously evaluate
its ability to sustain jurisdiction before choosing this
battleground.
1- Id. at 475.
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